Universal in praedicando, universal in causando
The works of Aristotle and St. Thomas abound in fundamental distinctions, and one of the most important is the distinction between the universal in praedicando and the universal in causando ; the fact is that one neglects this distinction at his own risk, for a confusion about the kinds of universal causality means that one falls into serious error where the understanding of their differences is necessary. We intend, therefore, in this paper, to expose the doctrine of St. Thomas on this distinction, and, by considering a well known error about God's causality, to point out the consequences one is led to when it is neglected.
I. THE GENERA OF UNIVERSAL CAUSES
In the second book of the Physics, which is concerned with the principles of the science of nature, Aristotle considers, among other things, the four species of cause, for the philosopher of nature de monstrates by all the causes.1 He first distinguishes them and defines them, and then turns his attention to the different modes of causation and the combination of these modes, in each species of cause ; finally he shows their importance in the philosophy of nature. 2 He begins by explaining that in each species of cause, be it effi cient, material, formal or final, we can distinguish the prior and uni versal cause from the proper and posterior cause. To show what he means, he gives examples ; the doctor, as efficient cause, is the cause of health as a proper and posterior cause, while the artist is the cause of health as the more common and prior cause. He follows with another example, this time in the species of formal causality. The proper and posterior cause of the diapason is the double proportion, while the prior and more common cause is the numerical proportion called multiplicity. In either cause the prior and more universal cause contains the other within the generality of its scope. 3 This distinction having been made and the examples given, St. Thomas, in his commentary, immediately adds : 4 cundum exempla hie posita de medico et artifice ; vel secundum communitatem causalitatis, u t si dicamus solem esse causam universalem calefactionis, ignem vero causam propriam : et haec duo sibi invicem corres pondent.
M anifestum est enim quod quaelibet virtus extenditur ad aliqua se cundum quod com m unicant in una ratione obiecti ; et quanto ad plura extenditur, tan to oportet illam rationem esse communiorem : et cum virtus proportionetur obiecto secundum eius rationem, sequitur quod causa superior agat secundum formam magis universalem et m inus contractam. E t sic est considerare in ordine rerum : quia quanto aliqua sunt superiora in entibus, tanto habent formas minus contractas, et magis dominantes supra materiam , quae coarctat virtutem formae. Unde et id quod est prius in causando, invenitur esse prius quodam m odo secundum rationem universalioris praedicationis ; u t puta, si ignis est prim um calefaciens, caelum non tan tu m est prim um calefaciens, sed prim um alterans.
This similarity, while it clarifies the genera of universal causes, poses a problem. Is it true that the logical order, the order of know ing, is in all ways parallel to the order of universal causality? Are the characteristics of the more universal causes, in other words, like the characteristics of the more universal predicates, in such a way that the study of the one would enable us to understand the other ? Are there, on the other hand, differences between them, the ignorance of which entails a basic failure to even understand the genera of uni versal causes at all ? The rest of this article is an answer to these questions.
II. THE UNIVERSALE IN PRAEDICANDO
The universale in praedicando is a result of the potentiality of our minds. The human intellect, being posterior to the objects it knows, must therefore accept its intelligible species from them.1 Before we are able to form these species, however, we are dependant upon sense knowledge : " Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu." 1 Our first experience is by means of the senses, which apprehend their objects directly. These objects exist with signate matter and its conditions, and since there must be an overcoming of matter to render something apt for intellectual knowledge, sense knowledge is only potentially intelligible.3 It remains for the agent intellect, by the act of abstraction, to render actually intelligible the objects of sense knowledge. 4 For this reason Aristotle and St. Thomas compare the intellect before it is informed to a blackboard on which nothing is written : " Intellectus noster est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum. " 6 Since there is a twofold conjunction to be found in material things, that of matter with form and the whole with its parts, and since abstraction is of things that are conjoined, St. Thomas makes a dis tinction in abstraction : " . . . duplex fit abstractio per intellectum. Una quidem secundum quod universale abstrahitur a particulari, ut animal ab homine. Alia vero secundum quod forma abstrahitur a materia ; sicut forma circuli abstrahitur per intellectum ab omni materia sensibili." 6 The operation by which a form is abstracted from matter is called formal abstraction, while the abstraction of a whole from its subjective parts is called total abstraction.7 It is total abstraction which concemes us here, for the universal in prae-dicando is its result. Total abstraction occurs when a universal whole is abstracted from its potential parts. When we abstract ' man ' from Socrates and Plato, we consider a whole which is found equally in the singulars from which it has been abstracted, and which can be predicated of them. The same is true when we abstract ' animal ' from ' man,' ' lion,' ' horse,' etc. In each case, the abstracted whole is considered as the superior which contains the objects from which it has been abstracted as inferiors. In the words of John of St. Thomas : " Abstractio autem totalis est, qua superius abstrahit ab inferiori et commune ab individuis, quia habet se ut totum respectu inferiorum includendo ilia virtualiter et implicite." 1 The abstracted nature is one in the intellect ; as a nature abstract ed from the individuals in which it inheres, it is called a universale metaphysicum, and insofar as it is a similitude of the nature which is found in the individuals from which it is abstracted, it is our means to having intellectual knowledge of them. It is from this known na ture that the intellect introduces a comparative act, whereby the nature is seen to be ordered to the inferiors from which it is abstract ed.2 This comparison forms the universale logicum, which is a relation of reason by which the inferiors, actually containing the abstracted nature, are seen as the terminus ad quern to which the nature tends, by its contraction and identification with them.®
The predication of the universal of its inferiors, which is the proper passion of universality, demands the second operation of the mind, when the abstracted nature is said of the inferiors in which it inheres. Because, in every abstraction, the intellect considers something separately from those things to which it is conjoined in reality, we signify by an affirmative proposition that the universal is the same ' secundum rem ' with the subject of which it is said. 4 There is a certain order to be observed within total abstraction it self. Our aim, as much as it is attainable, is a knowledge of things in their ' species specialissimae,' whereby we know them as distinct from all other species. But before we can approximate such deter minate knowledge, it is necessary to know them more confusedly, for due to the potentiality of the human intellect, it does not immediately 1. Curs. pliil., t.i, p.358 b 9. 2. " Universale logicum seu relativum et secunda eius intentio fit per actum com parativum, non per modum compositionis vel iudicii nec per modum inclusionis in in ferioribus, sed per modum simplicis apprehensionis, qua cognoscitur natura cum ordine et respectu ad inferiora." -J oh n o f St . T h om a s, Curs. phil. t.i, p.350 a 30.
3. " . . . esse in multis si sumatur potentialiter, pertinet ad ipsam aptitudinem, qua natura redditur potens, ut sit in multis per identificationem et multiplicationem in illis. Si autem sumatur actualiter, hoc quod est actu esse in multis, non est relatio universalis ad inferiora, sed identificatio et contractio ad illa, . . . " J oh n op St . T h om as, Curs. phil., t j , p.356 a 19. apprehend the determinate nature things require in order to be ; rather it knows things first in their more universal genera.1 Whence it is that we know ' animated body ' before distinguishing ' plant ' from ' animal,' and ' animal ' before distinguishing ' man ' from ' lion,' etc. Because the more general formalities are at the same time more removed from the differences things require in order to be, they are more confused and potential, though more known ' quoad nos. ' The order within total abstraction, therefore, is a movement from the potential and more knowable to us to the actual, which is more intelligible and knowable in itself ; because the more universal predicate is known first, and because it is at the same time more po tential, insofar as it explains its objects confusedly, the order of dim inishing universality is a process towards actuality, which ends when we know things in their ultimate species.
S. T h om as
The processus in determinando, which Aristotle establishes in the beginning of the Physics, must be seen in this light.2 He notes there the two things which are important for the acquisition of science. The first is that we must proceed from the more known to us to the less known to us, and the second is that the more known to us is the more universal and confused. The procedure from universality to concretion satisfies both the mode of human intellection and the demands of science, for science is perfect when things are known with all the determination they actually possess.
Given the potentiality of our intellect and the necessity of gradually augmenting our knowledge by further induction, Aristotle's order could not be other than it is. It is essential for us to emphasize that the more general is the universal in praedicando, the more super ficially does it explain the objects of which it is said. The perfection of our knowledge lies with the process towards concretion, whereby we know distinctly what is implied in the confused universals.
With the abstraction of a universal from its inferiors we attain a whole ; included in this whole are its integral parts. When we abs tract ' man ' from Socrates and Plato, for instance, we define the abstracted nature as ' rational animal ' ; the parts of the definition are called integral parts of the nature, for they actually compose the nature itself. So viewed, the abstracted nature is an integral whole. But insofar as the nature has been abstracted from the inferiors in which it inheres, it is said to contain them as potential parts, and when so considered, it is not an integral whole, but a universal or po tential whole, which contains its parts only potentially. For this reason it can be predicated equally of all of them ; if, on the other hand, the universal whole were constituted by its parts, it could not be predicated of them.1 If, for example, the nature ' man ' was com posed of its inferiors, it would be impossible to say ' Socrates is a man ' without implying contradiction.
Aristotle is careful to speak of confused wholes when speaking about the order of learning, for the universal in praedicando is precisely a ' confused whole ' rather than a ' composite whole,' and contains its parts only potentially.2 If the universal is said to be superior to its subjective parts, which are as inferiors contained under it, the superior ity is in the order of predication only, for in reality the less universal predicate is more actual, inasmuch as it signifies more properly the nature of things themselves. Superiority, then, in the case of the universal in praedicando, is synonymous with potentiality and con fusion, because the universal is less intelligible than its inferiors. ' We can also distinguish, in total abstraction, a difference between the abstraction of a ' species specialissima ' from the material singular and other abstractions. When we abstract ' man,' for example, from Socrates and Plato, we attain the most precise signification we can attribute to them. But when we abstract ' animal ' from the sin gulars, the universal whole which results is a genus, whose unity, which is formed by the mind alone, is purely logical, for it can itself be a part of its species, when they are discovered.
Since we wish to attain as determinate a knowledge of things as we can (which necessitates the passage from the more universal to the 1 . sciendum est quod confusa hic dicuntur quae continent in se aliqua in potentia et indistincte. Et quia cognoscere aliquid indistincte, medium est inter puram potentiam et actum perfectum, ideo, dum intellectus noster procedit de potentia in actum, primo occurrit sibi confusum quam distinctum ; sed tunc est scientia completa in actu, quando pervenitur per resolutionem ad distinctam cognitionem principiorum et elemen torum. Et haec est ratio quare confusa sunt primo nobis nota quam distincta. Quod autem universalia sint confusa manifestum est, quia universalia continent in se suas species in potentia, et qui scit aliquid in universali scit illud indistincte ; tunc autem distinguitur eius cognitio, quando unumquodque eorum quae continentur potentia in universali, actu cognoscitur : qui enim scit animal, non scit rationale nisi in potentia. Prius autem est scire aliquid in potentia quam in actu : secundum igitur hunc ordinem addiscendi quo procedimus de potentia in actum, prius quoad nos est scire animal quam hominen." In I Phy s., lect.l (ed. Leonine), n.7.
3. This point is explained clearly by Cajetan, when he compares total and formal abstraction. " Abstractio autem totalis fit per separationem a specificis actualitatibus, a quibus quanto aliquid est abstractius, tanto est potentialius, cum genus potestate con tineat inferiora ; et tanto est minus intelligibile, . . . " /re De Ente et Essentia, q.l, n.5. (5) less universal), we must not mistakenly think that there exist in na ture entities that correspond directly to our universals. We can know Socrates, for instance, as a man, an animal, an animated body and a substance, but we do not conclude that there is ' substance ' as such, or ' animal ' as such in nature. Nor should we conclude that he is composed of ' substance,' ' animated body,' etc.1 Socrates exists in virtue of a substantial form, by which form he is a man, an animal, etc., and we can therefore say that there are in him virtual distinctions which enable the intellect to predicate the different formalities of him.2 The same is true of all composites ; each natural thing exists in virtue of its substantial form, and it is that form which contains the other formalities which are predicated of it.3 Every genus which is pred icated of its inferiors achieves its unity from the mind alone, which abstracts from the differences with which things are found, and sig nifies what they have in common. The universal in praedicando, remember, always signifies in the mode of a whole. When we say that ' man ' is ' animal,' we imply that ' man ' as to all the word signifies, is ' animal.' While the predicate ' animal ' is confused, insofar as it does not distinguish men from brutes, it nevertheless signifies the whole of man. If this were not so it could not be said of its parts.4 It is this relationship which is the result of total abstraction, and which is characteristic of the universal in praedicando. In all our predica tions in the concrete mode, we signify in the mode of a whole, even though the whole may in reality be a part.5 ' Animal,' as a genus, is a universal whole potentially containing its subjective parts, while at the same time it is an integral part of its species.6 The same holds true for every genus, for in the descending order of universality, each 1 . " Dicendum quod non oportet secundum diversas rationes vel intentiones logicas, quae consequuntur modum intelligendi, diversitatem in rebus naturalibus accipere ; quia ratio unum et idem secundum diversos modos apprehendere potest. Quia igitur . . . anima intellectiva virtute continet id quod sensitiva habet, et adhuc amplius ; potest seorsum ratio considerare quod pertinet ad virtutem sensitivae quasi quoddam imnerfectum et materiale. ' Substance,' which is a genus only, is a whole in relation to ' in corporeal substance ' and ' corporeal substance,' which are its inferiors, and is therefore predicated equally of them. But if it is a whole in relation to its potential parts, it is nevertheless an integral part of its species, for it is necessary for their definition. ' Body,' which is one of its species, contains ' substance ' as an integral part, to which is added ' corporeal ' ; the two together make up the definition of ' body.' ' Body ' in its turn is a genus with respect to its species and subsequent ly becomes a part of them. As the genus becomes an integral part of its species, it does not explain their whole nature, for it is necessary to add the specific difference to complete the definition. It is only because of total abstraction, which terminates in confusion and po tentiality, that the genus can be considered as a whole predicable of its subjective parts.
The poverty of this kind of knowledge can be seen more clearly if we compare the universals by which we know to God's knowledge. God does not abstract His knowledge from objects themselves, for His science is the cause of things. His knowledge, though universal, is not a confused knowledge, but rather a proper knowledge of every singular thing in all its de terminations. The Divine Essence is a universal in repraesentando, which, unlike the universal in praedicando, is characterized by its actuality, by which means it effects a perfect and exhaustive know ledge.1 In other words, God's Essence, which is His means of knowing, represents at the same time the most universally as well as the most determinately, all the things to be known. This is in radical contrast to the universal in praedicando, for, though the more universal con cepts encompass a wider range of objects, their universality bespeaks confusion and indetermination. ' Animal ' for instance is more de terminate than ' man,' and signifies a greater range of objects than does its species, but it signifies them in relative confusion, which disappears only when we attain more specific knowledge of the same objects. The more we approach things in their distinctions, however, the more do we sacrifice the universality of our knowledge. If the universal in repraesentando were synonymous with the universal in praedicando, it would follow that God's knowledge, being the most universal, would also be the most indeterminate and potential.
Angelic knowldege is similar in this respect to the Divine Know ledge. Angels do not abstract their intelligible species from things ; rather, they are received from God with the creation of the angelic nature. These species participate in the ideas by which God creates all things. The angels are not in potency to knowing their objects, but, as in the case of God, they are prior to the things they know : 2 . . . ea quae in Verbo D ei ab aeterno praeextiterunt, dupliciter ab eo fluxe ru n t : uno modo, in intellectum angelicum ; alio modo u t subsisterent in propriis naturis. In intellectum autem angelicum processerunt per hoc quod Deus menti angelicae impressit rerum similitudines, quas in esse na turali produxit.
The angelic species are universals in repraesentando, and signify determinately and in their singularity the objects they represent.3
The closer the angel approaches the simplicity of the Divine Nature, the fewer are his species and the more perfect is his science, for the fewer species of the superior intellect attain all the objects the more numerous species of the inferior intellect attain, and attain them more perfectly : 1 N on est igitur per formas universaliores apud substantias superiores imperfectior cognitio, sicut apud nos. Per sim ilitudinem enim animalis, per quam cognoscimus aliquid in genere tantum , imperfectiorem cognitio nem habemus quam per similitudinem hominis, per quam cognoscimus speciem completam : cognoscere enim aliquid secundum genus tantum , est cognoscere imperfecte et quasi in potentia, cognoscere autem in specie est cognoscere perfecte et in actu. Intellectus autem noster, quia infi m um gradum tenet in substantiis intellectualibus, adeo particulatas simili tudines requirit quod unicuique cognoscibili proprio oportet respondere propriam similitudinem in ipso : unde per sim ilitudinem animalis non cognoscit rationale, et per consequens nec hominem, nisi secundum quid. Sim ilitudo autem intelligibilis quae est in substantia separata, est univer salioris virtutis, ad plura repraesentanda sufficiens. E t ideo non facit imperfectiorem cognitionem, sed perfectiorem : . . .
The more general is the universal in repraesentando, the more determinately does it represent its objects, while the more general is the universal in praedicando, the more confusedly does it signify the inferiors of which it is said. For us, distinct knowledge is effected only by a multiplicity of concepts proportionate to the known natures, and the more our science becomes determinate, the more do our concepts increase.
Our problem now boils down to this ; when we consider the order of causality, must we conclude that the more universal is the cause the more potential it is? Is there a parallel between the universal in causando and the universal in praedicando, which makes it necessary for us to consider the universal cause as a common and indeterminate cause which attains its effects only superficially in relation to the more proximate causes ?
III. THE UNIVERSALE IN CAUSANDO
The order of universal causality, while it is in some ways similar to the logical order within our predicated universals, is yet strikingly different, and it is this difference which will now occupy us ; by under standing the doctrine of St. Thomas on the character of the universal cause we forearm ourselves against serious philosophical errors.
We will begin with the more known to us. It is manifest by in duction that Socrates comes to be, and that he is generated by his
mother ; his existence is necessarily dependent upon hers in such a way that if she had not been, he would not now be.1 A question however, remains ; Socrates's mother causes an effect similar to her self, for Socrates is an individual with the same nature as she. Since the mother was also generated and at one time was not, and since human nature is found in her, it follows that she is not the cause of that nature, either in herself or in Socrates ; if she were the sole causal explanation of the nature of Socrates, she would (since she also has that nature) have to be the cause of herself.
It is the same with all univocal causality ; no univocal cause can be the cause of the nature of the species in which it participates.2 The mother is the cause only of the existence of human nature in Socrates. She is not the cause of the form, but of the informed composite, since it is the composite which is generated. It is necessary, therefore, if we wish to explain the nature as such, to seek a cause which transcends both son and mother. In other words, as there is a ' per se ' relation between the generated singular and the univocal cause, so there must be a cause which is related ' per se ' to the participated nature. The term of the generation is the existence of the individual, an accom plishment of many causes, each exercising a causality proper to its form. Since the univocal cause is not a species but a singular existing in a species, it is impossible that it be the cause of the species itself. The cause of the species must in a certain way contain the nature of the species within its form, while, of course, being superior to it.* Every effect, says St. Thomas, depends upon its cause insofar as it is the cause of that very effect.4 This is, in fact, included in the meaning of the word ' cause.' Now some agents are not the cause of 1. . . videmus ad sensum quod non fit quodlibet ex quolibet, sed ex semine hominis semper generatur homo. Ergo semen patris est causa effectiva filii." S. T hom as, In II Seni., d.l, q.l, a.4, Contra.
2. " Nullum particulare agens univocum potest esse simpliciter causa speciei : sicut hic homo non potest esse causa speciei humanae ; esset enim causa omnis hominis, et per consequens sui ipsius, quod est impossibile. Est autem causa hic homo huius hominis, per se loquendo. Hic autem homo est per hoc quod natura humana est in hac materia quae est individuationis principium. Hic igitur homo non est causa hominis nisi inquantum est causa quod forma humana fiat in hac materia. Hoc autem est esse principium genera tionis huius hominis. Patet ergo quod nec hic homo, nec aliquod aliud agens univocum in natura, est causa nisi generationis huius vel illius rei. Oportet autem ipsius speciei humanae esse aliquam per se causam agentem : quod ipsius compositio ostendit, et ordina tio partium, quae eodem modo se habet in omnibus, nisi per accidens impediatur. Et eadem ratio est de omnibus aliis speciebus rerum naturalium. Haec autem causa est Deus, vel mediate vel immediate : ostensum enim est quod ipse est prima omnium rerum causa. Oportet ergo quod ipse hoc modo se habeat ad species rerum sicut se habet hic generans in natura ad generationem, cuius est per se causa." S. T h om as, Contra Gentes, III, c.65 ; also Contra Gentes, II, c.21.
the ' esse ' of their effects, but only of their becoming. Insofar as the univocal cause is not the cause of the form, but of its inherence in the individual, the form as such is not its proper effect. It is the cause only of the becoming of the form, and its causality ceases with the termination of the becoming. 1 In other words the mother causes the ' fieri ' of Socrates, but not his nature or his existence. If she were the cause of the nature and ' esse ' of Socrates, Socrates could not exist without the continued exercized causality of his mother. But, in fact, he does exist without it. Hence, there is necessary a cause which is anterior to the mother's causality, which is responsible for Socrates's nature and ' esse ' and to which she is subordinated in causing him.
In all univocal causality, the form of the thing which comes to be does not depend ' per se,' and according to its ' ratio,' on the uni vocal cause, but only accidentally. The ' esse ' of the form in matter does not, in itself, imply motion or mutation, even though that form could not exist unless at the term of the becoming. The principle, therefore, upon which the form depends ' per se ' is incorporeal. The reason is that any natural thing, being a body, cannot move or cause unless it be itself moved, and is the cause only of the becoming of effects, and not of their natures or their existence. An incorporeal agent must be responsible for the existence of the form, though every natural form depends upon the preparation and receptability of the matter as a condition of its existence.
In conformity with these principles, St. Thomas teaches that incorporeal agents direct the heavenly bodies, to which are subordinat ed the univocal causes ; together they act upon matter and effect a transmutation so that the desired form is educed therefrom.2 The order of the cosmos and the causality of the univocal causes is achieved through their cooperation and subordination to the more universal causes, such as the sun ; without their causality there would be no becoming.
1. " Omnis enim effectus dependet a sua causa secundum quod est causa eius. Sed considerandum est quod aliquod agens est causa sui effectus secundum fieri tantum, et non directe secundum esse eius. Quod quidem convenit et in artificialibus, et in rebus naturali bus. Aedificator enim est causa domus quantum ad eius fieri, non autem directe quantum ad esse eius. Manifestum est enim quod esse domus consequitur formam eius ; forma au tem domus est compositio et ordo, quae quidem forma consequitur naturalem virtutem quarundam rerum. Sicut enim coquus coquit cibum adhibendo aliquam virtutem natu ralem activam, scilicet ignis ; ita aedificator facit domum adhibendo caementum, lapides et ligna, quae sunt susceptiva et conservativa talis compositionis et ordinis. Unde esse domus dependet ex naturis harum rerum, sicut fieri domus dependet ex actione aedificato ris. Et simili ratione est considerandum in rebus naturalibus. Quia si aliquod agens non est causa formae inquantum huiusmodi, non erit per se causa esse quod consequitur ad talem formam, sed erit causa effectus secundum fieri tentum." S. T h o m as, Ia, q.104, a.l, c.
Corporeal agents are as instruments of the incorporeal, and play the subordinate part in achieving their intended effects ; they are the means by which matter is disposed and the form educed there from.1 The univocal cause is subordinated to all the causes which produce its effect, in such a way that it presupposes them all in order that it exert its causality ; because the univocal cause is not the cause of the nature, but only of the becoming of that nature in one in dividual, we may say, with Cajetan, that univocal causality is not ' formaliter ' and ' per se ' causality : 2
Ubi enim est univocatio, ibi non est causa et causatum formaliter et per se, sed materialiter et per accidens : quoniam forma effectus formaliter non dependet a forma causae. N on enim hum anitas quae est in Socrate, formaliter sumpta, dependet in esse aut in fieri ab hum anitate Platonis patris : sed hum anitas Socratis, quia est haec, ideo dependet a patre. E t consequenter hum anitas, quae est fundam entum sim ilitudinis inter patrem et filium, non est de genere causae aut causati, nisi materialiter et per accidens : sed est de genere fundam entorum eiusdem ordinis.
The whole order of causality is necessary in order that any single effect come to be. God, by means of the separated substances, moves the heavenly bodies, which in turn move by local motion the univocal causes to produce an effect intended by Himself as principle agent.* While He concurs with all subordinated causes to produce every effect, He does not do so equally with all. The higher angels, insofar as they are endowed with a more perfect wisdom, exercise a providence over the lower angels, who in turn control the inferior parts of the universe. The higher is the cause, the more universal is its effect, and the more determinate is its causality. 4 The sun, insofar as it simultaneously causes a multitude of effects, for example, is more uni versal in its causality than are any of the univocal causes which attain only one effect at a time. 6 The separated substances, insofar as they are free from the restrictions of matter, exert a still more universal causality.6 According to the universality of the cause, there follows a universality of its effect.7 The mother, for instance, causes Socrates alone, while the sun, in the same act of causing, simultaneously causes Socrates and all the other things that are becoming. God, the su preme cause, attains universally all that is, by one instantaneous ' concursus. ' Effects which seem accidental when considered in relation to their proximate causes, are seen to be ordained when seen in the light of the causality of the higher cause : 1 M anifestum igitur est, quod effectus relati ad aliquam inferiorem cau sam n ullum ordinem habere videntur, sed per accidens sibiipsis coincidunt ; qui si referantur ad superiorem causam communem, ordinati inveniuntur, et non per accidens conjuncti, sed ab una per se causa simul producti sunt.
The blooming of one plant, if it is considered in relation to the particular causality of that plant itself, is seen to be accidental to the blooming of another plant. But if the blooming of both is reduced to a higher more perfect cause, the two effects are seen to be ordained, for the heavens are the simultaneous cause of the blooming of both : 1
Sicut floritio hujus herbae vel illius, si referatur ad particularem vir tutem , quae est in hac planta vel in illa, nullum ordinem habere videtur, -im m o videtur esse accidens -, quod hac herba florente illa floreat. E t hoc ideo, quia causa virtutis hujus plantae extendit se ad floritionem hujus, et non ad floritionem alterius : unde est quidem causa, quod haec planta floreat, non autem quod simul cum altera. Si autem ad virtutem corporis caelestis, quae est causa communis, referatur, invenitur hoc non esse per accidens, quod hac herba florente illa floreat, sed esse ordinatum ab aliqua prim a causa hoc ordinante, quae simul movet utram que herbam ad floritionem. Now this order seems to be similar to the order within our uni versal predicates, but the difference is really immense, for the greater extension of causality, characteristic of the more universal cause, does not mean that it is more remote or potential. It is, in fact, be cause of its perfection and greater actuality able to attain its effects more perfectly and intimately than does the inferior cause. If the universal causes were potential and indeterminate, as is characteristic of the universal in praedicando, the higher causes would be more remote than the inferior causes, with the result that they would attain their effects less determinately. The reduction of what seems acci dental, when viewed in relation to lower causes, to an order when seen in the light of the higher causes does not imply, as is the case in the logical order, that the inferior determines ab extrinseco the causality of the higher causes, but that the lower cause is subject to the higher cause, and takes its very determination in causing from it, so that
both work per modum unius towards the production of their effect in all its determination. The more universal cause, therefore, not only causes more effects by a single act, but, in virtue of its power it also attains those effects more intimately and determinately than does the inferior cause.1 The more universal is the cause, the more is it the cause of its effects in all their determinations. Its power, as well as its causative motion, is derived from God, and moves the power of the inferior causes, and just as we say that anything comes to be more by God's power than by any other, we can say that the more universal is the cause, the more does the effect depend upon its power. For this reason, John of St. Thomas, when speaking of universal causes, describes them in these words : 2 . . . universalitas in causando ita respicit effectus suos, quod in illis non attingit solum rationes seu praedicata universalia et communia, sed etiam particularia. Im o quanto universalior est virtus in causando, tanto pro fundius penetrat effectum omnesque particulares illius rationes attin g it et causat, eo quod omnes participant illam rationem communem, et sic virtus, quae potest super totam illam rationem, consequenter potest super omnia, quae illam participant. Sicut caelum, quod est causa universalis istorum corporum, attingit omnes rationes corporeas usque ad individuales diffe rentias ; et Deus, qui est causa universalissima entis in quantum ens, causat omnem rationem, quae quoquo modo participat entitatem .
We must remember that the causes are subordinated to each other, and while each has its proper effect, it achieves it only inasmuch as it is moved by the superior. The concurrence is not one of partial causes accidently conjoined, but of complete causes in an order of dependance on a first ; insofar as there is an essential subordination of all the causes which produce an effect, that effect can be said to be equally the effect of each of its causes. A further consideration of God's causality will clarify the doctrine.
It is the teaching of St. Thomas that God excercises an immediate providence over all things, and that it is by his power that everything exists and remains in existence. If this power of God were removed, everything, save himself, would cease to be : 3 C um autem Deus sit ipsum esse per suam essentiam, oportet quod esse creatum sit proprius effectus eius ; sicut ignire est proprius effectus ipsius ignis. Hunc autem effectum causat Deus in rebus, non solum quando pri mo esse incipiunt, sed quandiu in esse conservantur ; sicut lum en causatur in aere a sole quandiu aer illum inatus manet. Q uandiu igitur res habet esse, tandiu oportet quod Deus adsit ei, secundum m odum quo esse habet. ' Esse,' which is the proper effect of God, depends, as such, upon the presence of its cause. As we have seen, the presence of the generator is necessary for the becoming of the generated, to such an extent that if the generator ceased to exert its causality the genera tion would also cease ; in like manner the causality of God is necessary in order that things remain in being : 1
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Sicut igitur cessante actione causae efficientis, quae agit per m otum , in ipso instanti cessat fieri rerum generatarum, ita cessante actione agentis incorporei, cessat ipsum esse rerum ab eo creatarum. Hoc autem agens incorporeum, a quo omnia creantur, et corporalia et incorporalia, Deus est,... a quo non solum sunt formae rerum, sed etiam materiae. . . . Unde sequitur quod divina operatione cessante, omnes res eodem momento in nihilum deciderent, . . .
Although the ' esse ' of everything must be directly attributed to the Divine causality, there is no necessity to deny either the power or the exercise of causality to creatures. While God is the universal cause of everything that happens, He has seen fit to rule the universe through means of secondary causes, whereby the higher angels exer cise a providence over the lower angels, who in turn exert a causality on the cosmos.2 He has not only given His creatures existence, and thus constituted them as effects, but has further given them the power to act upon other things and produce their own effects, whereby they more fully imitate Him.3 The interrelationship of causes and effects produces the order of the universe.4 Since the higher causes 1. S. T h om as, De Pot., q.5, a.l, c. 2. " Quia vero ad providentiam divinam pertinet ut ordo servetur in rebus ; con gruus autem ordo est ut a supremis ad infima proportionaliter descendatur : oportet quod divina providentia secundum quandam proportionem usque ad res ultimas perveniat. Haec autem proportio est ut, sicut supremae creaturae sunt sub Deo et gubernantur ab ipso, ita inferiores creaturae sint sub superioribus et regantur ab ipsis. Inter omnes autem creaturas sunt supremae intellectuales, sicut ex superioribus patet. Exiget igitur divinae providentiae ratio ut ceterae creaturae per creaturas rationales regantur." S. 3. " Sicut est boni bonum facere, ita est summi boni aliquid optime facere. Deus autem est summum bonum, ut in Primo ostensum est. Igitur eius est optime facere omnia. Melius autem est quod bonum alicui collatum sit multorum commune, quam quod sit pro prium : quia bonum commune semper invenitur esse divinius quam bonum unius tantum. Sed bonum unius fit multis commune si ab uno in alia derivatur, quod non potest esse nisi inquantum diffundit ipsum in alia per propriam actionem : si vero potestatem non babet illud in alia transfundendi, manet sibi ipsi proprium. Sic igitur Deus rebus creatis suam bonitatem communicavit ut ima res, quod accepit, possit in aliam transfundere. Detra here ergo actiones proprias rebus, est divinae bonitati derogare." St. T h om as, Contra Gentes, III, c.69. In this chapter, St. Thomas gives many reasons to show the compa tibility of secondary causality with the divine causality.
participate more fully in the Divine goodness, they also have a greater role in producing this order. 1 God does not need causes other than Himself, for He could make all that is or could be instantaneously without them. Moreover, they are completely dependent upon Him, both as to their being and as to their causing. St. Thomas shows how this is so by considering the various ways one thing can be the cause of the action of another :*
God is, first of all, the cause of the action of things insofar as He bestows upon them the powers by which they act. Nothing can act unless it receives the power from God, and insofar as this is so, God is necessary in order for it to produce an effect. But He is not necessary for this reason alone ; there is a second way of causing the action of another : 3 N am etiam alio modo conservans virtutem dicitur facere actionem, sicut dicitur quod medicinae conservantes visum, faciunt videre.
God not only gives other causes their power to act, but He main tains this power in existence. The concurrence of God is continually necessary so that the creature may actually cause ; God keeps both the agent and its power in existence as it causes.
Since no created thing can move another unless it is itself moved, there is a third way in which God is necessary for all causality : 4
Tertio modo dicitur una res esse causa actionis alterius in quantum movet eam ad agendum ; in quo non intelligitur collatio aut conservatio virtutis activae, sed applicatio virtutis ad actionem ; sicut homo est causa incisionis cultelli ex hoc ipso quod applicat acumen cultelli ad incidendum movendo ipsum. E t quia natura inferior agens non agit nisi mota, eo 1. St. Thomas considers this order at length in the Contra Gentes, III, cc.77-84. He shows that God rules His universe by means of the secondary causes, and that among these causes the higher exercise a causality over the lower. The higher angels dominate the lower and the cosmos is itself subordinate to their causality. The order extends even within the human species, where it is shown how the more intelligent men rule over the less intelligent.
2. De Pot., q.3, a.7, c. He must initially move the created power in order that it may act.
First of all, then, nothing exists without His concurrence, for He gives existence to everything. Secondly, He gives creatures the power to produce effects and sustains that power in existence so that they may use it. Thirdly, He moves them so that they may act in the measure of which they are capable. Each of these operations takes place in every causality, and the denial of any one of them denies the thomist doctrine.
We maintain, therefore, with Aristotle and St. Thomas, that secondary causes are real causes, and that they produce effects which are proportioned to their powers. The existence of these effects must be immediately attributed to God, since He alone is ' esse ' and has the power to communicate it to others. But the secondary cause, as we saw above in the case of the mother, is really a cause, and the determinate effect is the effect of all its causes, and not of God alone.
All this means that secondary causes act in virtue of a causality which is in them, and that the effects are really their effects. The proper effects of the secondary causes, however, are not ' esse ' but rather the formalities which are added to it : 1 Secundum ordinem causarum est ordo effectuum. Prim um autem in omnibus effectibus est esse : nam omnia alia sunt quaedam determina tiones ipsius. Ig itur esse est proprius effectus prim i agentis, et om nia alia agunt ipsum inq uan tum agunt in virtute prim i agentis. Secunda autem agentia, quae sunt quasi particulantes et determinantes actionem primi agentis, agunt sicut proprios effectus alias perfectiones, quae determinant esse.
In every effect from whatever causality, we must attribute im mediately that which is most intimate and essential in it to God, with out denying the efficacity of the secondary causes. Since the term of every becoming, of every causal action, is the ' esse ' of that which becomes, and since only God can bestow existence, it follows that all the causes, save God, which concur in the causality participate in producing an effect which is beyond the capacity of any one of them. They must, therefore, be under His direction as first cause : 2 . . . cum aliquae causae effectus diversos producentes com m unicant in uno effectu, praeter diversos effectus, oportet quod illud commune producant 
S. T hom as

U N IV E R S A L IN PRAEDICANDO, U N IV E R S A L IN CAUSANDO
ex virtute alicuius superioris causae cuius illud est proprius effectus. E t hoc ideo quia, cum proprius effectus producatur ab aliqua causa secundum suam propriam naturam vel formam, diversae causae habentes diversas naturas et formas oportet quod habeant proprios effectus diversos. Unde si in aliquo uno effectu conveniunt, ille non est proprius alicuius earum, sed alicuius superioris, in cuius virtute agunt ; . . . Each cause exercises, according to its form, a proper causality and produces a proper effect. But this effect, for all causes except God, will not be the term of the causality, for the term includes the effects of the secondary causes. Insofar as the secondary causes produce effects which determine ' esse ' to a certain genus or species, they cooperate with the first cause in the production of the effect : 1
Omnes autem causae creatae com m unicant in uno effectu qui est esse, licet singulae proprios effectus habeant, in quibus distinguuntur. Calor enim facit calidum esse, et aedificator facit dom um esse. Conveniunt ergo in hoc quod causant esse, sed differunt in hoc quod ignis causat ignem, et aedificator causat dom um . Oportet ergo esse aliquam causam superiorem omnibus cuius virtute omnia causent esse, et eius esse sit proprius effectus. E t haec causa est Deus.
While we may distinguish different formalities in an effect, it nevertheless remains one, and in common with all other created things it shares in ' esse.' Because we distinguish the formalities within an effect, it is not true that we are speaking of an accidental unity ; we are, rather, considering an ' unum per se ' which has come about through the power of many causes. Each secondary cause effects its proper formality, and all the formalities thus caused concur to make the one effect. Since the effect, in its totality, is beyond the power of any created cause or combination of causes, they are subordinated to the principal cause as its instruments : 2 . . . invenimus, secundum ordinem causarum, esse ordinem effectuum, quod necesse est propter similitudinem effectus et causae. Nec causa secunda potest in effectum causae primae per virtutem propriam, quamvis sit ins trum entum causae primae respectu illius effectus. Instrum entum enim est causa quodam m odo effectus principalis causae, non per formam vel virtutem propriam, sed in quantum participat aliquid de virtute princi palis causae per m otum eius, sicut dolabra non est causa rei artificiatae per formam vel viitutem propriam, sed per virtutem artificis a quo move tur et eam quoquomodo participat.
In any action, God's power is more the cause of that action than is the proper causality of any subordinated cause or group of causes. His power is, in fact, the immediate cause of every effect. To show that this does not deny the proximity of the subordinated causes to their effects, which would be contrary to sense experience, St. Thomas makes some fruitful precisions.
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He says that we may consider two things with reference to any agent. The first is the fact that it is an agent and acts, and the second is the power by which it acts. He then proceeds to show that the power of the inferior agent depends upon the power of the superior, because the superior agent gives it the power by which it acts, or conserves it, or moves it to act. In the case of God, all three are true, as we have shown. 1 Now from this it follows that the action of the inferior agent is not to be explained by that agent alone, for it depends upon the power of all its superior causes. It acts, in other words, in virtue of them all. Just as the lowest agent in the order of the causality is seen to be im mediately joined to its effect, so the power of the highest agent is like wise immediate to the production of that effect. This follows from our principles ; the power of the lowest cause acts in virtue of the motion of its proximate superior cause, and the superior cause in turn acts because of the power of a yet superior cause. In this way, we arrive at the supreme cause, which achieves the effect by its own power, and is therefore its immediate cause : " Et sic . . . virtus su preme agentis invenitur ex se productiva effectus, quasi causa immediata." 1 Since God's power is necessarily present in order that any effect come about, He is said, as principal cause, to be immediately united to every effect 1 immediatione virtutis,' while the proximate cause is immediate to its effect ' immediatione suppositi.' If God withdrew His power as principal cause, the causality of the inferior causes would immediately cease.3
1. " In quolibet enim agente est duo considerare, scilicet, rem ipsam quae agit, et virtutem qua agit : sicut ignis calefacit per calorem. Virtus autem inferioris agentis de pendet a virtute superioris agentis, inquantum superius agens dat virtutem ipsam inferiori agenti per quam agit ; vel conservat eam ; aut etiam applicat eam ad agendum, sicut artifex applicat instrumentum ad proprium effectum ; cui tamen non dat formam per quam agit instrumentum, nec conservat, sed dat ei solum motum." S. T hom as, Contra Gentes, III, c.70.
2. " Oportet ergo quod actio inferioris agentis non solum sit ab eo per virtutem pro priam, sed per virtutem omnium superiorum agentium : agit enim in virtute omnium. Et sicut agens infimum invenitur immediatum activum, ita virtus primi agentis invenitur immediata ad producendum effectum : nam virtus infimi agentis non habet quod pro ducat hunc effectum ex se, sed ex virtute proximi superioris ; et virtus illius hoc habet ex virtute superioris ; et sic virtus supremi agentis invenitur ex se productiva effectus, quasi causa immediata ; . . . Sicut igitur non est inconveniens quod una actio producatur ex aliquo agente et eius virtute, ita non est inconveniens quod producatur idem effectus ab inferiori agente et Deo : ab utroque immediate, licet alio et alio modo." S. T h o m as, Contra Gentes, III, c.70.
3. S. T h o m as , De Pot., q.5, a.8, c. ; also ibid., q.5, a.l, c.
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That is why St. Thomas can say that the fourth way one thing can be the cause of another is insofar as it is the superior cause con trolling the inferior causes which are as its instruments : 1 . . . quarto modo unum est causa actionis alterius, sicut principale agens est causa actionis instrum enti ; et hoc modo etiam oportet dicere, quod Deus est causa omnis actionis rei naturalis. Q uanto enim aliqua causa est altior, tanto est communior et efficacior, et quanto est efficacior, tanto profundius ingreditur in effectum, et de remotiori potentia ipsum reducit in actum.
Because God is the cause of the action of all the other causes, and because for that reason He is immediate to each effect, He attains more fully each effect than does any other cause. The closer is a cause to the divine cause, the more universal it is, and the greater is its role in the causality ; in other words, the higher is the cause, the more immediately and profoundly does it touch its effect.
We see, for example, that the generated, as it is becoming, is immediately united to its generator. But the power of a superior cause is more immediately united to that effect, and exerts a deeper influence on it than does the power of the inferior cause, because it moves the inferior cause to act. It is for this reason that we can say that the proximate cause is immediately conjoined to its effect as to its substance, while the superior cause is also immediate to its effect, but by its power.
Because God is more profoundly within any effect than is any other cause, and because He is continually present to all His creatures in their being and their becoming, His effects are more intimately related to Him than is the body to the soul.2 It is from His good ness, and not from necessity, that He bestows upon creatures the power of concurring to produce effects, the ' esse ' of which is beyond the pro ductive capacity of any creature.
All causes concur to the one effect, yet do so as completely sub ordinated to God as first cause in every respect, acting as an ' unum ' in the causality : 3 est. Ostensum est autem in prim o quod prim um agens est Deus. C um igitur esse sit communis effectus om nium agentium, nam omne agens facit esse actu ; oportet quod hunc effectum producunt in q ua n tum ordinantur sub prim o agente, et agunt in virtute ipsius.
There can be no cooperation in the production of a given ' per se ' effect unless there is an order of causes whereby the lower are subordinated to the higher, and unless all act by the directing power of the principal cause. If this were not so, there could be no unity from the standpoint of causes, and no ' per se ' effect could be produced through their concurrence. We see, therefore, that St. Thomas is fully justified when he says that the same effect is from God and from the proximate cause, for the inferior cause is completely subordinated to God, in such a way that the whole effect is attributed both to God and to it according to diverse modes : 1 P atet etiam quod non sic idem effectus causae naturali et divinae v irtu ti attrib uitur quasi partim a Deo, et partim a naturali agente fiat, sed totus ab utroque secundum alium m odum : sicut idem effectus totus attri b uitur instrumento, et principali agenti etiam totus.
The subordinated causes are causes of the whole effect though not the whole of the effect, while God, on the other hand, causes the whole of the effect, insofar as He is immediately conjoined to it as the cause of its ' esse,' which is most intimate and necessary to it. Moreover, in Him, power and substance are identical, and He is there fore immediately conjoined with each effect substantially, unlike other causes, which, while attaining certain effects by their power, are not as a consequence substantially present. God, therefore, is said to be in all things. 2 When St. Thomas says that both kinds of universal causes are characterized by a greater amplitude of form, we can now see the difference between the amplitude of the universal in praedicando and the amplitude of the universal in causando. The more universal predicate, being more potential, is determined by the specific difference, which it contains only potentially, to become a part of the species ; the universal cause, on the other hand, is more actual, and thus more determinate, and all its inferior causes are within its control, for it actually reaches the whole effect and is not determined by a causality extrinsic to its own. To deny this would make every generable sub stance an unum per accidens, and hence indefinable.
The angels, as we saw, know through their universals in re praesentando, which are at once more general than ours and more determinate as well. Since all causality is based on knowledge (whether that knowledge be in the cause itself or in another), the higher the angel, the more universal will be its causality, and since its knowledge is more determinate the closer it approximates its Divine exemplar, its causality is likewise more determinate.1 This is, as we have seen, unlike the order of universality within the human intellect, whose more universal predicates are more confused and potential, the remedy for which is a sacrifice of universality in its movement towards concretion, whereby it is extrinsically determined by new knowledge.
So that we may see how easy it is to confuse the order of causality with the order of predication, thereby attributing to universal causes the imperfections of the universal in praedicando, we will now turn our attention to a certain error regarding the universal causality of God.
IV. THE CONFUSION OF THE GENERA OF UNIVERSAL CAUSES
The error which will occupy us is the error of Molina, for it is the most important, and others can be seen in its light.
St. Thomas, as we have already seen, shows that God's causality is compatible with the causality of other causes, provided we recognize their complete subordination and dependence on Him as first cause. This position is faithful both to sense experience, which attests to the causality of material things, and to the equally important truth that God, as first cause, is the cause of every effect. The subordination of the causes is so thorough that the whole effect is attributed to each of its causes as to a single complete cause. We cannot, says St. Thomas, oppose, in the effect itself, what is attributable to God and what is attributable to the secondary cause : " . . . non est distinctum quod est ex causa secunda et causa prima." 2 This means that there are not real distinctions corresponding to our way of knowing ; we can consider in any effect certain formalities which, while existing, are not really distinct, but are simply the same formality seen as more or less universal, depending upon the exactness of our knowledge. We can, as we saw, relate these different formalities to different causes. St. Thomas, therefore, means that there is no real distinction between 1 C um dicimus, neque D eum per concursum universalem, neque causas secundas esse integras, sed partiales causas effectuum, intelligendum id est de partialitate causae, u t vocant, non vero de partialitate effectus : totus quippe effectus et a Deo est, et a causis secundis : sed neque a Deo, neque a causis secundis, u t a tota causa, sed u t a parte causae, quae simul exigit concursum et influxum alterius : non secus ac cum duo trah un t navim . . . Ex dictis praeterea intelligetur, quando causae subordinatae sunt inter se, ita u t aliae sint magis, aliae minus universales, aliae particulares, necesse non esse, u t superior in eo ordine semper moveat inferiorem, etiam si essen tialiter subordinatae sint inter se et a se m utuo pendeant in producendo aliquo effectu : sed satis esse si immediate influant in effectum.
For Molina, it is not a question of total causes which are essential ly subordinated, but of two partial causes which cooperate to produce an effect. He does not feel compelled to posit, outside of the simul taneous concurrence of God with the secondary cause, an added motion by which the secondary cause is activated to produce its effects. He states further that such a complete subordination diminishes God's causality, for it implies that God, as first cause, attains the effects only mediately, because the secondary cause is immediate to its effect as a complete cause. By this doctrine, Molina intends to vindicate both the transcendence of God and the causality of the secondary causes. We will attempt to show, however, that he denies the very notion of universal causality, conceiving it in the mode of the universal 1. It remains true, however, that only God can cause ' esse.' What we wish to dispel is the view that ' esse ' is a separate, general formality which, with other formalities, com poses an effect. Such a view leads some to speak of the determinations in the effect of the secondary causes as real additions to a general ' esse ' : this confuses the whole causal order with the logical order.
2. Concordia in lam., q.14, a.13, disp.26, (ed. de Paris, 1876), pp.152-153, 158.
in praedicando, and that the causality of the first cause is reduced thereby to the superficiality commensurate with the confused universal in relation to its inferiors.
We have shown that it is necessary for God to concur with the action of all secondary causes in the production of their effects, since everything is dependent upon Him ; the actions and effects of second ary causes are created being, and they cannot exist unless He maintains them in existence. As John of St. Thomas explains : 1 . . . omne ens, quocumque modo sit, a Deo participatum est et derivatum. Sed effectus ipse et actio sunt entia quaedam creata, ergo a Deo sunt parti cipata, ergo actio nostra et effectus illius etiam a Deo debet procedere, indiget ergo causa creata in quocumque effectu concursu D ei simultaneo, qui magis requiritur propter effectum, qui est ens participatum a Deo, quam propter ipsam causalitatem causae secundae.
The concurrence of the first cause with the secondary cause is of such a nature that the causality of both causes terminate in the same effect, which is said to be from either as from a complete cause ; neither the first cause nor the secondary cause is a partial cause ; each cause is rather a total cause in the production of the whole effect. Again in the words of John of St. Thomas : 2 . . . ille concursus divinus debet identificari cum concursu causae creatae, quia tendunt ad eundem term inum , siquidem ipsemet effectus, qui est a concursu causae creatae, dependet etiam a concursu Dei, quia per sus pensionem eius potest desinere. Ergo oportet, quod in eodem termino conveniant uterque concursus, et hoc est identificari ratione eiusdem ter m ini, quem producunt.
It is this total subordination within the order of causality wrhich Molina denies. He says that the question is not one of total causes, but of two partial causes concurring to produce the same effect " ac cum duo trahunt navim." There is, for him, one concurrence produced by the conjunction of two causes, each contributing a partial causality.
To expose this error, further distinctions are needed. We have spoken of God as first cause, and as a principal cause in producing every effect. We have further stated that all other causes are second ary causes, and are as instruments, insofar as they are moved by God to the production of their effects. While all this is true, we must not think that the natural causes are pure instruments, or that they produce no proper effect by their own causality. When we speak of causality with reference to God, all other causes are called secondary, but are yet principal causes. The secondary cause is a principal cause, for it acts by its own form and is productive of an effect which is direct-ly attributable to it. St. Thomas himself poses an objection which seems to deny this dignity to the secondary cause : 1 Q uanto aliqua causa magis influit in effectum, tanto est principalior. Sed causa prim a plus influit in effectum quam secunda, . . . Ergo causa prim a est principalior quam secunda. E t ita mens nostra non est princi palis causa sui actus, sed Deus.
Since God is the principal cause of every effect, and is closest to that effect, it seems that the secondary cause cannot be a principal cause. His answer, however, does not permit such a diminution of the secondary cause : 2
The secondary cause is a principal cause of its effect, and ex ercises a proper causality commensurate with its natural potencies. It can be called an instrumental cause, however, insofar as it is moved by God to the production of its effect. But we must not think that its initial characteristic is that of the instrument, for it is called an instrument per posterius only. The proper characteristic of the instrument is that it be moved by a superior agent cause, and that it act in virtue of a forma fluens which is not permanent and which is capable of producing its effect only insofar as it is elevated by the superior cause : 3 . . . duplex est causa agens : principalis et instrumentalis. Principalis quidem operatur per virtutem suae formae, cui assimilatur effectus, sicut ignis suo calore calefacit. . . Causa vero instrumentalis non agit per virtutem suae formae, sed solum per m otum quo m ovetur a principali agente. Unde effectus non assimilatur instrumento, sed principali agenti, sicut lectus non assimilatur securi, sed arti quae est in mente artificis. Now the natural cause, in comparison with the pure instrument, is a principal cause. If it be considered in relation to the ultimately first cause, it then is seen to participate in the notion of instrumentality, for God moves it to act. The secondary cause, as a principal cause, is considered in relation to its effect, while as an instrument it is conT ' ■ sidered in relation to the first cause.4
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God and the secondary cause are both immediate to the same effect, each according to its mode. Because the natural cause is itself a principal cause, God is not therefore a remote cause ; His causality is in no way diminished, for there is always a total and perfect subordination of all causes to Him as the perfect and unlimited cause.
These are the initial distinctions Molina first questions and then denies. He questions first the notion of the first cause moving the second to actually cause (which we will consider later), and he implies that if the secondary cause is a total cause in the production of each effect, and that if it attains the whole of its effect, then God is reduced to the position of a mediate cause, and that the secondary cause is alone immediate to its effect. This is not so ; the causality of the secondary cause is completely compatible with the causality of the first cause, and God is present to all effects both by His power and by His substance. It is Molina who diminishes God's causality, and who commits the same error he thought to escape ; further, in attempting to vindicate the principal causality of the secondary cause, he reduces its causality at the same time. For him, then, the causality of both God and the secondary cause are diminished, whereas he had hoped for the opposite. This can be seen by turning our attention to his notion of partial causality.
Molina states that God, in cooperation with the secondary cause, is a partial cause in the production of every effect ; this, of course, denies the very notion of universal causality. If God were only a partial cause, His action and mode of operation would be limited, for He would depend upon the extrinsic concurrence of the secondary causes, without which He would be incapable of producing a deter minate effect.1 The secondary cause would not be entirely subalio, aut naturaliter, aut violenter ; per quem modum dicuntur illuminare sol et luna ; calefacere ignis et ferrum ignitum et aqua calefacta.
" Alio modo aliquid operatur ad effectum aliquem instrumentaliter : quod quidem non operatur ad effectum per formam sibi inhaerentem, sed solum in quantum est motum a per se agente.
" Haec enim est ratio instrumenti, in quantum est instrumentum, ut moveat motum ; unde, sicut se habet forma completa ad per se agentem, ita se habet motus quo movetur a principali agente, ad instrumentum, sicut serra operatur ad scamnum. Quamvis enim serra habeat aliquam actionem quae sibi competit secundum propriam formam, ut dividere, tamen aliquem effectum habet qui sibi non competit nisi in quantum est mota ab artifice, scilicet facere rectam incisionem, et convenientem formae artis. Et sic instrumentum habet duas operationes : unam quae competit ei secundum formam propriam ; aliam quae competit ei secundum quod est motum a per se agente, quae transcendit virtutem propriae formae." 8. T hom as, De Ver., q.27, a.4, c. In this text St. Thomas considers natural things as principal causes, and opposes them to pure instruments. However, when he considers the order of causality in reference to God, he will consider the creature, because it is moved by God, as an instrument. Notice, however, that the creature is not an ins trument in the same way as the saw, for it has its own fixed form, by which it acts. The very nature of the universal cause demands that it be the cause of the whole of its effects, and that it attain those effects more intimately than do the inferior causes, which cannot cause unless total ly subordinated to it in such a way that all causes act as one in the causality.
Molina's doctrine, considered from the standpoint of the causes, would reduce God's causality to a potentiality comparable to the genus in relation to its species. The genus is said to attain or signify the whole of its inferiors, but only confusedly, insofar as it abstracts from the differences required for things to be. It is not an integral whole but a potential whole. In order to signify its species more determinately, it becomes an integral part of them. Since a part is not the whole, the specific difference is added in order to compose the species. ' Animal ' is as a whole in relation to * man ' and ' horse,' and is also a part of ' man,' for ' man ' is defined as ' rational animal.' The genus is determined by the specific difference, and a union of the two composes the species in the mind. It is this relationship, due to the nature of the logical order, which Molina transcribes into the order of causality.
For Molina, the superior cause does not essentially subordinate the inferior cause to its purpose, but rather cooperates as a partial cause towards the production of an effect. It goes without saying that the inferior cause, in this conception, is determinative of the causality of the superior cause, and that it attains more completely the effect. God is passive to the further determination of secondary causes in the same way that the genus is determined by the specific difference when, as a part, it composes the species. Such an understanding of universal causality is completely repugnant to the very nature of the universal cause, for the universal cause is superior precisely be cause it is determinately present to the whole of each effect, and itself subordinates and directs the inferior cause, rather than being extrinsically determined by it.
It is curious that Molina, having destroyed the universal causality of God, does not, as he should, see a partiality in the effects commen surate with the partiality in the causes. Notice that he says, when speaking of causes, that he restricts the word ' partial ' to the cause alone, and that the whole of the effect is from God and the secondary cause :
. partíales causas effectus, intelligendum id est de partialitate causae, ut vocant, non vero de partialitate effectus ; totus quippe effectus et a Deo est, et a causis secundis : ..." 1 But if God is only a partial cause, dependent for the determina tion of a causal act on other causes, how is it possible for Him to be the cause of the whole of the effect ? A partiality from the side of the cause demands a partiality from the side of the effect. Molina's position demands that one part of the effect be referred to the first cause and one part to the secondary cause. Just as the genus, as a part, is not the whole of its species, so neither is the effect of one partial cause able to be the whole of the effect of many partial causes.
If this conclusion were drawn, as it should have been, it would diminish God's causality, for it implies that God is not the cause of all being.2 It is also evident that this view, while attempting to maintain the causality of the secondary cause, diminishes it as well, for according to Molina the inferior cause is also a partial cause, when in reality the secondary cause is most certainly a whole cause ; this, in fact, constitutes its proper perfection. Molina would have two insufficient causes constitute together a sufficient causality, where as in truth it is only two hierarchically subordinated principal causes which produce the whole effect. We can show further the super ficiality to which God's causality is reduced by Molina's error. There is, according to St. Thomas, outside the concurrence by which God acts simultaneously with the secondary causes, a physical premotion by which He moves them towards the production of an effect.3 This conclusion follows necessarily from the nature of created agents, which are indeterminate with regard to the producing of an individual effect, and which are in potency to operating. This premotion is not a metaphorical motion, but a real action proceeding from the first agent cause which moves the created cause to act. In the words of John of St. Thomas : 4
Haec applicatio et praevius concursus aliquid physicum relinquit in causa, quam movet, et non solum est assistentia extrínseca vel moralis m otio aut sympathia. It is not a question here of motion which the secondary cause receives by which it moves itself to act, nor is it the operation of the secondary cause ; neither is it the form by which the secondary cause is constituted in actu primo, for this is presupposed to the constitution of the cause itself, and is sufficient for the cause, as a principal cause, to posit the actions and produce the effects of which it is capable. The physical premotion is a motion from God by which the secondary cause is applied to the determinate effect, and which inheres, as a certain quality, in the secondary cause while it causes. St. Thomas explains it with these words : 1 . . . quod virtus naturalis quae est rebus naturalibus in sua institutione collata, inest eis u t quaedam forma habens esse ratum et firm um in natura. Sed id quod a Deo fit in re naturali, quo actualiter agit, est u t intentio sola, habens esse quoddam incom pletum, per m odum quo colores sunt in aere, et virtus artis in instrumento artificis.
This ' qualitas per modum motus ' is necessary so that the second ary cause is freed from its indetermination with regard to the multi plicity of acts of which it is capable. It determines the cause to the individual act, for every secondary cause is in potency to acting, and must receive its determination from another.
The simultaneous concurrence of God explains His concurrence with the effect and the action which produces it, but it is not sufficient to explain the subordination of the secondary causes to Him as first cause. If the secondary cause is dependent upon Him only insofar as He exercises a simultaneous concurrence, it follows that He would somehow be dependent upon the created cause in such a way that He could not be said to dominate every effect ; His causality would be determined by secondary causes.
It is exactly this physical premotion which Molina denies. He says, as we have stated above, that it is not necessary that the superior and universal cause move the inferior to act, but it is sufficient that they both attain immediately the effect : " . . . necesse non esse, ut superior in ea ordine semper moveat inferiorem, etiam si essentialiter subordinatae sint inter se et se mutuo pendeant, in producendo aliquo effectu ; sed satis esse se immediate influant in effectum." 1 As we have seen, however, the simultaneous concurrence is not enough, for if the secondary cause were to act without being moved by God, there is something extrinsic to His causality which He does not direct ; He would have to wait upon the action of the secondary cause, and as such, would not control the causation.
This further error reminds us again of the logical order. If the genus is taken as an integral part of its species, the specific difference is added extrinsically to it in order to express the nature of the species. Molina considers God's causality in this way. The secondary cause determines the universal cause extrinsically, that is, outside the domain of the higher cause, in the same way that the genus is determined ex trinsically as it is a constitutive part of its species.
In denying physical premotion, Molina misunderstands the simultaneous concurrence as well. If there are two causes which are not entirely subordinated, they cannot produce the one effect in such a way that, within the effect itself, the results of the two causes are indistinguishable. The reason is that they cannot act as one in the causality unless they are subordinated completely so that the superior moves the inferior. It is well to remember the words of St. Thomas :
. . non enim. plura faciunt unum nisi inquantum unum sunt." % Without the total subordination of the secondary cause to God, the whole of the effect cannot be attributable to Him. It would be nec essary to distinguish in the effect that which is from God and that which is from the secondary agent, which would imply that the whole effect is not from Him as from its first cause. The effect would, in fact, be an unum per accidens, whose causes would be per accidens causes, wT hich implies that the whole cosmos is, at root, unintelligible.
Following in the footsteps of Molina there have been some who posed the problem a bit differently, and who teach the conclusions to which we hold Molina himself responsible. Among these authors, we find diverse opinions, but all concur in denying God's universal cau sality. Fr. R. Th. De Regnon is an example ; he says that, in any causality, there must be a first mover, which causes the movement of the other causes.3 This movement is not, however, the physical premotion of which we have been speaking, for he continues with these words : 1 Serez-vous contraints d 'en conclure que D ieu prédétermine chaque action particulière, suivant le système formaliste du bas moyen âge ? T out au contraire. Si vous voulez vous inspirer du Réalisme des grands Docteurs, après avoir distingué dans la cause seconde l 'activité même et ses déterminations, vous ferez pénétrer l 'influence de la Cause Universelle jusqu'au fond même de l 'activité considérée dans son universalité.
La m otion de la Cause Première, essentielle à tout " agir " a pour terme 1'" agir " lui-même dans tous les " agirs " particuliers. C 'est une m otion universelle restant la même dans tel " agir " et tel autre " agir " -Mais, par là même que cette m otion est universelle, elle est indéterminée par rapport aux " agirs " particuliers, et c'est à la cause seconde q u 'il re vient de particulariser son " agir," et de déterminer q u 'il soit tel ou tel.
E n d 'autres termes, chaque action d 'une cause seconde est complè tement déterminée, puisque rien d 'indéterminé ne peut exister. Cependant dans chaque agir particulier, il y a lieu de distinguer 1'" agir " e t l '" agir de telle manière," agere et agere taie. " Agir " suppose une M otio n D ivine qui pénètre le fond même de l 'activité créée en lui laissant toute sa sphère d 'action. " Agir telle action " provient de la cause seconde qui possède toutes ses déterminations particulières dans l 'éminence de son activité mise en acte.
V oilà comment les Maîtres entendaient l 'influence de la Cause Première tom bant proprement sur la cause seconde, la perfectionnant, Ja m ettant en acte, opérant en elle pour la rendre opérante : Deus operatur in omni operante.
Â cet enseignement reviennent tous les textes qui affirment la nécessi té d 'une M otion Divine, le caractère universel de cette motion, et le rôle de la créature dans la détermination de chacune de ses actions particulières. particular act, it does not have to be moved at all. It is as a principal cause, already fully capable in its own right of acting to produce a certain species of effect ; it must be moved precisely because it cannot determine itself to pass from potency to act in the production of the singular effect. Either the physical premotion determines the creature to this effect or it is unnecessary. To hold to an indifferent ' premo tion ' is self-contradictory, for the ultimate determination would still rest with the power of the creature. Furthermore, God would still be a partial cause of the determinate effect, and would act with the coop eration of the secondary cause, which would also be only a partial cause. He speaks of the universal motion of God as being determined by the secondary cause itself, but, unlike Molina and consistent with his own principles, he distinguishes a partiality from the standpoint of effects, and here the disastrous consequences of any such diminution of universal causality becomes clearer. Since, for De Regnon, God is the first and universal mover, His proper effect is the agere of any action, in its universality, while the hoc agere is the result of the sub sequent self-determination of the secondary cause. Therefore, the action, which is a singular action, is composed of the formal distinctions agere and hoc agere, each of which is proportioned to a different cause. Such a conception, of course, destroys the unity of the action as well as the unity of its effect.
We have spoken of a certain similarity between the universal in praedicando and the universal in causando. The more universal cause can (somewhat like the predicated universal) be called the cause of more effects than the inferior cause, and the formality under which its effects are grouped and referred to it will be more general that the formality of the effects of the inferior cause. We gave, following St. Thomas, the example of fire and the heavens. Fire is the proper cause of heating, while the heavens are the cause of alteration; but we mean that fire is the cause of the production of heat, while the heavens are the cause of every alteration. There is no alteration in communi, but only the singular instances of alteration of a given species. Hence, the heavens (as well as the fire) cause heat, but their causality is not limited to heating alone, but to every alteration. We are, therefore, able to abstract from the different species of alteration, and, combining them under the same formality ' alteration,' see them as caused by the more universal cause. We do.not imply by this that there are real distinctions in the effect. We do not say, for example, that the singular effect is composed of ' heating ' and ' alteration,' for the effects which come to be, as well as the motions which produce them, are one ; the different formalities which are said of them are due to our abstractions. The heating can be considered as such or as alteration, without concluding that alteration is a distinct thing from heating. To consider things otherwise would itself be a projection of the logical order on the real ; the more general effect would be said to exist as such, whereas in reality the one effect, considered under different formalities, is reducible to the different causes upon which it depends. It is the same when we consider ' man ' as such or as ' ani mal ' ; we do not imply that there is a formal distinction between the two. The same substantial form makes the man ' man ' and ' animal' ; we do not imply that he is made up of the two as of composing parts.
De Regnon, however, would be forced into just such a position. He speaks as if there were a formal distinction in the singular act between the agere and the agere tale. God would cause the agere and the creature would cause the agere tale, which would destroy the unity of the motion, and thereby would destroy the unity of the effect. If God is the cause of the agere alone, how is it possible for Him to com pletely control the action of the secondary cause ? And if He does not control it, how can its effect be an unurn per se ? If God's causality is considered in this way, He would be a superficial cause in relation to the secondary causes, which would determine His general causality to a specific effect. He would not be the perfect and determinate cause of the determinate effect ; as a partial cause, His power would be inde terminate and insufficient, needing the determination of other causes extrinsic to His direction and not completely subordinated to Him.
It is the universal in praedicando which, as it is the more general, is also more potential, but the order of universal causes bears no resemblance to the intentional order in this respect. The more univer sal cause has a more universal form, but it is at the same time more actual and dominant in its causality.
The difference, in this regard, between the universal in praedicando considered as the superior containing its inferiors, and the universal in causando is that the formality of the logical universal, as it becomes an integral part of its inferiors, does not explain them wholly, while the universal cause attains the whole of its effects ; the formality which is related to the universal cause is not a part of the effect to which some thing extrinsic is added. Every action is a singular action, and though we may consider agere as a genus reducible to its species, we do not imply that agere exists, as such, in nature, or that something is added to it to concretize it to be an agere tale. It is the singular action which is caused by God as first cause, and proceeds from the secondary cause as moved to its execution. God is, therefore, the mover and cause of the agere tale. Nothing in the action comes from the secondary cause as adding something to the general action of God. The two causes combine, as subordinated principal causes, in the production of the same act.
Read in this light, finally, the following interpretation of St. Tho mas's doctrine of causality : 1
U N IV E R S A L IN PRABDICANDO, U N IV E R S A L IN CAUSANDO
In the view of St. Thomas, by divine concurrence, God always works w ith all finite causes w ithout in any way depriving them of their own true causal action. God and creature, each in its own sphere, exercise a true efficiency, the First Cause effecting being as its ordinary effect and secondary causes effecting change in existing being so that it is being of a definite kind.
And we read further of " the ordinary non-intervention of God's causality in the secondary causes's production of its proper effect." 1 We are told, moreover, that to deny the above principle would be a denial of the true efficacity of finite causes. 2 According to this opinion, God would cause ens in communi while the secondary causes, acting outside His direction, would cause a certain kind of being. The effect would be a determinate effect because of the causality of the secondary cause, and existent because of God's causality. God would, therefore, be the most superficial of causes, for the effect is after all a determinate thing, and the cause which is most explicative of its determination is the most perfect cause. This error conceives the formalities by which we denominate a thing as being real formalities. When we say, for instance, that God causes being, we would, following this opinion, say that there is a real thing, being, in every effect. The effect, however, would not come wholly from God, for He would be a superficial cause depending upon other causes to determine His exclusive effect.
Such an understanding of God's causality distorts the truth, and denies the fundamental notions St. Thomas is careful to preserve. In evidence we can give St. Thomas's answer to this very view. Some said that God caused ens in communi, and that the secondary causes were entirely responsible for the distinctions in things. St. Thomas answers with these words : 3 . . . si intentio alicuius agentis feratur ad aliquid unum tan tu m , praeter intentionem eius erit, et quasi casuale, quidquid sequatur, quia accidit ei quod est principaliter intentum ab eo ; sicut si aliquis intenderet facere aliquod triangulatum , praeter intentionem eius esset quod esset m agnum vel parvum.
Cuilibet autem com m uni accidit speciale contentum sub eo ; unde si intentio agentis est ad aliquod commune tantum , praeter intentionem eius esset quod qualitercumque determinaretur per aliquod speciale ; sicut si natura intenderet generare solum animal, praeter intentionem naturae esset quod generatum esset homo vel equus. Unde si intentio D ei operantis respiciat tantum ad creaturam in communi, tota distinctio creaturae casua liter accidet.
If God is not the cause of the whole of the effects, as first cause, it is necessary to conclude that everything in the universe happens by chance ; if God does not cause the whole of every effect, there is some thing which escapes His causality and which is consequently accidental to His intent. Because He is the most universal cause, He would be, most properly and extensively, a causa per accidens.
A confusion about the kinds of universal causes lead us almost necessarily to this conclusion, which, because it is so grave, demands that we redirect our attention to the fundamental distintions we have labored to expose, for it is only by paying constant attention to them that we can hope to succeed where others have failed.
